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g u i l t y o f t h e c r i m e of f o r g e r y . A p p e l l a n t was s e n t e n c e d t o 
s e r v e o n e t o f i f t e e n y e a r s i n t h e U t a h S t a t e P r i s o n . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Dur ing t h e month of O c t o b e r , 1 9 7 3 , one L o t t i e 
Andreason f a i l e d t o r e c e i v e a c h e c k f o r $173 which c u s t o m a r i l y 
a r r i v e d each month from San F r a n c i s c o ( T . 5 5 ) . I t was l a t e r 
d i s c o v e r e d t h a t t h e m i s s i n g c h e c k had been cashed* t h a t someone 
had f o r g e d Mrs . A n d r e a s o n ' s name on t h e back ( T . 5 5 ) , and t h a t 
a p p e l l a n t ' s s i g n a t u r e was a l s o on t h e b a c k of t h e check ( T . 6 8 ) . 
Mrs . Andreason had n o t g i v e n anyone t h e a u t h o r i t y t o s i g n h e r 
name on t h e check (T.55) . 
A p p e l l a n t a d m i t t e d t h a t on t h e 9 t h day o f O c t o b e r , 
1973 , he went i n t o t h e Utah S t a t e E m p l o y e e ' s C r e d i t Union , where 
he i s a member, and c a s h e d a c h e c k f o r $173 , p u t t i n g $75 i n t o h i s 
, a c c o u n t and k e e p i n g $98 ( T . 9 3 ) . He f u r t h e r a d m i t t e d t h a t t h e 
check had L o t t i e A n d r e a s o n ' s name and a d d r e s s on i t ( T . 1 0 1 ) . 
A p p e l l a n t l i v e d two d o o r s down from M r s . Andreason in 
an a p a r t m e n t complex and t h e i r m a i l b o x e s were v e r y c l o s e t o g e t h e r 
and were opened by a common door ( T . 5 8 , 5 9 , 6 1 ) . A l s o , a p p e l l a n t ' s 
name, A n d e r s o n , i s v e r y s i m i l a r t o A n d r e a s o n . 
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In e x p l a i n i n g how he came t o c a s h Mrs . A n d r e a s o n ' s 
c h e c k , a p p e l l a n t a l l e g e s t h a t he met a g i r l (T.91) whom he 
s l e p t w i t h s e v e r a l t i m e s (T.100) . A p p e l l a n t d i d no t know 
t h e g i r l ' s name ( T . 9 2 ) . A p p e l l a n t f u r t h e r a l l e g e d t h a t t h e 
g i r l a s k e d him t o c a s h a check f o r h e r , and t h a t he d i d so 
a t h i s c r e d i t u n i o n (T.93) . A p p e l l a n t a l l e g e s t h a t he h a s 
no t seen t h e g i r l s i n c e (T.94) . 
S h o r t l y a f t e r c a s h i n g t h e c h e c k , which had Mrs, 
A n d r e a s o n ' s name and a d d r e s s c l e a r l y on i t ( T . 1 0 1 ) , a p p e l l a n t 
went t o Canada i n o r d e r t o h i d e ou t ( T . 9 7 ) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE VERDICT WAS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e c h a r g e d a p p e l l a n t 
as follows: 
"That on or about the 9th day 
of October, 1973, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the said Thomas Franklin 
Anderson did, with a purpose to defraud 
another, utter and alter a writing of 
another without his authority. . . ." 
-3-
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Appellant contends that the evidence presented by the prosecu-
tion was insufficient to support a conviction for the crime of 
forgery. Respondent submits that an examination of the evidence 
shows every element of the crime of forgery to be conclusively 
established. 
Before re-examining the evidence, i t i s important to. 
point out that a jury verdic t must stand unless i t appears that 
the evidence was so inconclusive or unsat is factory that reasonable 
uiinds must have entered reasonable doubts tha t the crime was 
committed. State v . Sull ivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 
(1957); State v . Danks, 19 Utah 2d 162, 350 P.2d 146 (1960). In 
other words, the strong presumption i s tha t a jury verdict i s 
co r rec t . Appellant, to p r eva i l , has the burden to prove tha t the 
jury verdict was unreasonable, and t h i s he has fa i l ed t o do (see 
Point I I ) . Also, when evidence i s viewed on appeal, i t i sv iewec 
in a l ight most favorable to the ve rd i c t . State v. Ward, 10 
Utah 2d 34, 341 P.2d 865 (1959); State v. Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 
208, 357 P.2d 183 (1960). As t h i s Court has s t a t ed : 
m 
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"We reverse a jury verdict only 
where we conclude from a consideration 
of all the evidence and the inferences 
therefrom viewed in the light most 
favorable to such verdict that the 
findings are unreasonable." State v. 
Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d at 214. 
In order to obtain a conviction, it was-necessary for 
the state to prove that appellant (1) uttered and altered a 
writing of another without his authority, and that (2) he had 
an intent to defraud. It is undisputed by appellant that he 
cashed the check (T.93). It is also undisputed that the 
check belonged to another person, Lottie Andreason (T.54-56), 
and that she did not authorize appellant to cash it (T.55) . 
Therefore, the only remaining question is whether there was 
sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably believe that 
appellant had the requisite intent to defraud. Respondent 
contends that there is more than sufficient evidence demonstratin< 
fraudulent intent. 
In reviewing the evidence it must be remembered that 
since intent is a matter of mental state, it is usually shown 
or inferred from the circumstances in which the instrument is 
passed, State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750 (1936) ; State v 
-5-
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Peterson, 22 Utah 2d 377, 453 P.2d 696 (1969). 
F i r s t i s the evidence of appe l l an t ' s cashing the 
forged check without a reasonable explanation of h i s acqu i s i -
t i on and possession of the instrument. In the absence of a 
sa t i s fac to ry explanation by appellant of his acquis i t ion and 
possession of the check, the testimony showing the forged nature 
of the check and i t s possession and passing by appellant i s 
suf f ic ien t to warrant an inference of appe l l an t ' s knowledge of 
the f a l s i t y of the check and h i s i n t en t to defraud. State -v. 
Booton, 85 Idaho 51, 56, 375 P.2d 536, 539 (1962); State v. 
Young, 203 Kan. 296, 302, 454 P.2d 724, 730 (1969); Pollock v. 
People, 166 Colo. 340, 342, 433 P.2d 738 (1968); State v . Dewey, 
41 Utah 538, 550, 127 Pac. 275, 279 (1912). 
Appel lant ' s only explanation for h i s act ions was t h a t 
he met a g i r l (T.91) , s lept with her several nights (T.100) , 
without even knowing her name (T.92) , cashed a check for her, 
which jus t happened to belong to h is neighbor (T.93), and has 
not seen her since (T.94) . Respondent submits tha t the jury 
could ea s i l y f ind tha t the above was not a reasonable explana-
t ion for appe l l an t ' s a c t i o n s . 
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Second i s the evidence tha t appellant fled and 
hid in Canada shor t ly af ter the passing of the forged 
instrument (T.95). The act ions of the appellant in going 
to Canada were those of a man who knew he had broken the 
law. Since he went to Canada so shor t ly af ter the check 
was cashed, i t i s e n t i r e l y reasonable tha t a jury would 
infer tha t appe l l an t ' s ac ts were those of a man with a 
gui l ty conscience. Fl ight ce r t a in ly i s a factor that a 
jury i s e n t i t l e d to weigh to determine c u l p a b i l i t y . 
Third is the evidence tha t a p p e l l a n t ' s mailbox 
was so close to Mrs. Andreason's, and t h a t t h e i r names are 
so s imi l a r . The apartment manager t e s t i f i e d that mailmen 
often place mail in the wrong boxes. I t i s very reasonable 
for a jury t o ponder the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t a mailman made a 
mistake and gave Andreason's mail to Anderson, put t ing i t in 
box 226 instead of 228. I t is a l so reasonable for a jury to 
consider the p o s s i b i l i t y tha t appellant t r i e d to cash the 
check which accident ly f e l l in to h i s hands. 
Because of a l l of the above circumstances, respondent 
contends that the elements of the crime were subs tan t ia l ly 
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proved and that if the evidence is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict, the conviction should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE JURY VERDICT I S COMPLETELY REASONABLE. 
As a p p e l l a n t p o i n t e d o u t i n h i s b r i e f : • 
11
 . . . i f t h e S t a t e ' s e v i d e n c e 
i s s u c h t h a t r e a s o n a b l e minds c o u l d 
b e l i e v e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doub t 
t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was g u i l t y , t h e 
v e r d i c t must be s u s t a i n e d . " S t a t e v . 
M i l l s , 122 Utah 306 , 249 P . 2 d 2 1 1 , 212 
(1952) . 
A p p e l l a n t , however , a l l e g e s t h a t t h e j u r y v e r d i c t i n t h e i n s t a n t 
c a s e was u n r e a s o n a b l e and t h a t t h e v e r d i c t s h o u l d be o v e r t u r n e d . 
The o n l y argument a p p e l l a n t o f f e r s in s u p p o r t of t h i s a s s e r t i o n 
i s t h a t i t i s u n r e a s o n a b l e t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t would 
be s t u p i d enough t o c a s h a s t o l e n c h e c k a t a c r e d i t u n i o n where 
he was w e l l known and d e p o s i t some o f t h e money in h i s a c c o u n t . 
Responden t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e j u r y v e r d i c t was e n t i r e l y 
r e a s o n a b l e and t h a t r e a s o n a b l e minds would so c o n c l u d e . R e s p o n -
d e n t knows of no law o r p r e c e d e n t which h o l d s t h a t a j u r y must 
c o n s i d e r t h e d e f e n d a n t t o be an i n t e l l i g e n t or r e a s o n a b l e man 
o r t o assume t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t a l w a y s a c t s r e a s o n a b l y . F u r t h e r -
more, i t i s e n t i r e l y r e a s o n a b l e for a j u r y t o f i n d t h a t a 
' - 8 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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d e f e n d a n t h a s f a i l e d t o a c t r e a s o n a b l y d u r i n g t h e commiss ion 
of a f o r g e r y . I t i s u n d i s p u t e d t h a t few, i f any , c r i m i n a l 
a c t s a r e r e a s o n a b l e . 
The j u r y , i n a c r i m i n a l c a s e , h a s t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
of d e t e r m i n i n g t h e f a c t s of t h e c a s e and of j u d g i n g t h e 
c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e w i t n e s s e s . The j u r y c a n o b s e r v e t h e f a c i a l . 
e x p r e s s i o n s , manne r i sms , and t o n e of v o i c e of w i t n e s s e s and t h u s 
a r e i n t h e b e s t p o s i t i o n t o d e t e r m i n e who i s t e l l i n g t h e t r u t h . 
I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , a p p e l l a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t some g i r l had 
him c a s h a check f o r h e r and t h a t she t h e n d i s a p p e a r e d . He 
t e s t i f i e d t h a t he s p e n t s e v e r a l n i g h t s w i t h h e r b u t d i d n o t know 
her name. T h i s C o u r t h a s p o i n t e d o u t many t i m e s : 
"A f i n d e r of f a c t i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y 
bound t o a c c e p t as c o n c l u s i v e a t e s t i m o n y 
of a w i t n e s s . H i s c r e d i b i l i t y may be 
impeached by s e l f - i n t e r e s t or i m p r o b a b i l i t y 
so t h a t i t would b e e n t i r e l y w i t h i n t h e 
r e a l m of r e a s o n t o d i s c o u n t o r t o e n t i r e l y 
d i s c r e d i t i t . " N i c h o l v . W a l l , 122 Utah 589 , 
253 P . 2 d 3 5 5 , 356 ( 1 9 5 3 ) . 
See a l s o S t r o n g v . T u r n e r , 22 Utah 2d 294 , 452 P . 2 d 3 2 3 , 324 (1969; 
w h e r e i n t h e C o u r t s a i d t h a t s e l f - i n t e r e s t may j u s t i f y n o n -
a c c e p t a n c e o f t e s t i m o n y . 
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The t e s t i m o n y o f a p p e l l a n t a t t r i a l was n o t o n l y 
i m p r o b a b l e b u t was a l s o e n t i r e l y s e l f - s e r v i n g and c o m p l e t e l y 
u n c o r r o b o r a t e d by any o u t s i d e e v i d e n c e . The j u r y had t h e 
r i g h t t o t a k e such f a c t s i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n w h i l e coming t o 
a d e c i s i o n . • 
CONCLUSION 
Responden t s u b m i t s t h a t r e a s o n a b l e minds c o u l d b e l i e v e 
beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was g u i l t y and 
t h a t t h e j u r y v e r d i c t i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e was r e a s o n a b l e and 
s h o u l d n o t be o v e r t u r n e d . Responden t s e e k s a f f i r m a n c e of t h e 
v e r d i c t of g u i l t y . 
R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d , 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
EARL P . DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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